Welcome to my website!
I am an associate professor in the economics department at the University of Southern California (USC) and an affiliate of BREAD, CEGA, and NBER.
I work on a range of topics in labor economics, development economics, and political economy, focused on interactions between the state and disadvantaged communities in India and the United States.
The Limits of Political Representation: evidence from India (with Veda Narasimhan). May 2026. Conditionally accepted at American Economic Review: Insights
Political inclusion is widely believed to improve governance, which has motivated the creation of elected representatives for highly localized constituencies. This paper studies 1.2 million ``hyperlocal'' representatives across 150,000 local governments in rural India. Exploiting discontinuities that determine the number and identity of these representatives, we assess how expanded representation affects governance outcomes. We find precisely estimated null effects on core functions, including public project management, intermediation in access to welfare programs, oversight of public finances, and the equity of benefit allocation. These findings highlight the limits of expanding political representation if representative capacity is weak.
Polity size and local government performance: evidence from India (with Veda Narasimhan). American Economic Review (2024), 114(11): 3385-3426. (lead article) [Online appendix]
Abstract: Developing countries have increasingly decentralized power to local governments. This paper studies the implications of a central element of decentralization – polity size– using population-based discontinuities that determine local government boundaries for over 100,000 Indian villages. Over the short and long-run, individuals allocated into local governments with smaller populations have better access to public goods. We provide suggestive evidence that these results are related to heightened civic engagement and stronger political incentives, without any observable evidence of other mechanisms such as elite capture.
Marriage Markets and The Rise of Dowry in India (with Gaurav Chiplunkar) Journal of Development Economics (2023), 164: 103-115 [Ungated draft] [Online Appendices]
Abstract: Dowry payments are common in many marriage markets. This paper uses data on over 74,000 marriages in India over the last century to explain why the institution of dowry emerges and how it evolves over time. We find that the proportion of Indian marriages including dowry payments doubled between 1930 and 1975, and the average real value of payments tripled. We empirically test whether four prominent theories of dowry can explain this rise, and find support for only one: dowry emerges due to increased differentiation in groom quality as a result of modernization. We also show that the average real value of dowry payments declines after 1975 and demonstrate this can be rationalized within a search model of marriage markets.
Coverage: Live Mint , Ideas For India
Jobs for Sale: Corruption and Misallocation in Hiring. American Economic Review (2021), 110(10):3093-3122 (lead article) [Ungated draft]
Abstract: Corrupt government hiring is common in developing countries. This paper uses original data to document the operation and consequences of corrupt hiring in a health bureaucracy. Hires pay bribes averaging 17 months of salary, but contrary to conventional wisdom, their observable quality is comparable to counterfactual merit-based hires. Exploiting variation across jobs, I show that the consequences of corrupt allocations depend on the correlation between wealth and quality among applicants: service delivery outcomes are good for jobs where this was positive and poor when negative. In this setting, the parameter was typically positive, leading to relatively good performance of hires.
Coverage: VoxDev
Improving Last-Mile Service Delivery using Phone-Based Monitoring (with Karthik Muralidharan, Paul Niehaus and Sandip Sukhtankar) American Economic Journal: Applied Economics (2021), 13(2): 52-82 [Ungated Draft] [AEA RCT registry]
Abstract: Improving "last mile" public-service delivery is a recurring challenge in developing countries. Could the rapid adoption of mobile phones provide a simple, cost-effective means to do so? We evaluate the impact of a phone-based monitoring system on improving the delivery of a program that transferred nearly a billion dollars to farmers in the Indian state of Telangana, using an at-scale experiment randomized across 5.7 million farmers. A randomly selected sample of officials were told that a representative sample of beneficiaries in their jurisdiction would be called to measure the quality of program implementation. This simple announcement led to a 1.5% increase in the number of farmers receiving their benefits, with a 3.3% increase among farmers in the bottom quartile of landholdings. The program was highly cost-effective, with a cost of 3.6 cents for each additional dollar delivered.
Coverage: Hindustan Times Op-ed, Financial Express
Cash Transfers for Child Health: Experimental Evidence from India (with Karthik Muralidharan, Paul Niehaus and Sandip Sukhtankar), Working paper. August 2025 [AEA RCT registry]
Despite significant economic growth, child development outcomes in India remain poor. Using a large-scale experiment in which randomly-selected mothers receive cash transfers for the first two years of their child's life, we examine the relationship between income and child development in the Indian state of Jharkhand. Treated mothers and children experienced large increases in nutritional intake, and an index of motor and cognitive skills improved by 0.12SD. However, child anthropometric indicators improved only in areas with low rates of open defecation. These results suggest that poor sanitation is a key explanatory factor for the poor translation of increases in income into child growth in India.
The Limits of Targeted Hiring Subsidies: Evidence from the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (with Manisha Jain and Corina Mommaerts), Working paper. April 2026
Employer-side wage subsidies are an important component of active labor market policy in many countries. We study the effectiveness of this approach in the context of the largest such program in the United States, the federal Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC). WOTC subsidizes up to 40% of first-year wages when firms hire certain categories of disadvantaged workers and is applied to more than two million hires annually. Using linked administrative data, we estimate WOTC's impact on labor market outcomes using three complementary quasi-experimental approaches, including age-based eligibility discontinuities, eligibility expansions, and firm-level changes in WOTC utilization. We find precise null effects on hiring, employment, and earnings across all specifications, and can rule out effects on hiring as small as 0.2 percentage points. The results imply that employers hire the same workers they would have hired in the absence of subsidies, so that the program primarily operates as a transfer to the firms, where most benefits accrue to a small number of large firms. To understand these findings, we collect original data on the hiring processes of WOTC-utilizing firms and present evidence that perceived legal risks as well as other organizational and reputational factors prevent the subsidy from factoring into hiring decisions. Our findings highlight how the effectiveness of wage subsidies depends not only on financial incentives, but also on the institutional environment in which they operate.
The Impact of Incarceration on Employment and Earnings (with Andy Garin, Dmitri Koustas, Carl McPherson, Sam Norris, Matt Pecenco, Evan Rose and Yotam Shem-Tov) Econometrica (2025), 93(2) (Summary) (Journal version)
We study the effect of incarceration on wages, self-employment, and taxes and transfers in North Carolina and Ohio using two quasi-experimental research designs: discontinuities in sentencing guidelines and random assignment to judges. Across both states, incarceration generates short-term drops in economic activity while individuals remain in prison. As a result, a year-long sentence decreases cumulative earnings over five years by 13%. Beyond five years, however, there is no evidence of lower employment, wage earnings, or self-employment in either state, as well as among defendants with no prior incarceration history. These results suggest that upstream factors, such as other types of criminal justice interactions or pre-existing labor market detachment, are more likely to be the cause of low earnings among the previously incarcerated, who we estimate would earn $5,000 per year on average if spared a prison sentence.
The Effect of Incarceration on Mortality (with Sam Norris and Matt Pecenco), Review of Economics and Statistics (2024), 106 (4): 956–973.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of incarceration on mortality using administrative data from Ohio between 1992 and 2017. Using event study and difference-in-differences approaches, we compare mortality risk across incarcerated and non-incarcerated individuals before and after pre-scheduled releases from prison. Mortality risk halves during the period of incarceration, with large declines in murders, overdoses, and natural causes of death. However, there is no detectable effect on post-release mortality risk, meaning that incarceration increases longevity. These estimates reflect the high-risk environment faced by criminal justice-involved individuals when not incarcerated and suggest non-carceral policies that could reduce these risks.
The Effect of Parental and Sibling Incarceration: Evidence from Ohio (with Sam Norris and Matt Pecenco), American Economic Review, (2021). 110(9):2926-2963 [Non-technical 2-page summary] [Ungated Draft] [Official Draft]
Abstract: Every year, millions of Americans experience the incarceration of a family member. Using 30 years of administrative data from Ohio and exploiting differing incarceration propensities of randomly assigned judges, this paper provides the first quasi-experimental estimates of the effects of parental and sibling incarceration in the US. Parental incarceration reduces the likelihood of their child's future incarceration by 4.9 percentage points and improves their adult neighborhood socioeconomic status. While estimates on academic performance and teen parenthood are imprecise, we reject large positive or negative effects. Sibling incarceration leads to similar reductions in criminal activity. [Non-technical 2-page summary]