The Effect of Parental and Sibling Incarceration: Evidence from Ohio (with Sam Norris and Matt Pecenco) Revise and Resubmit at the American Economic Review
Every year, millions of Americans experience the incarceration of a family member. Using 30 years of administrative data from Ohio and exploiting differing incarceration propensities of randomly assigned judges, this paper provides the first quasi-experimental estimates of the effects of parental and sibling incarceration in the US. Contrary to conventional wisdom, parental incarceration has relatively beneficial effects on children, reducing their likelihood of incarceration by 3.2 percentage points and improving their adult socioeconomic status. We also reject policy-relevant effects of parental incarceration on academic performance and teen parenthood. Sibling incarceration has similar effects, reducing incarceration likelihood by 6.7 percentage points.
Corruption in hiring for public sector jobs is common in developing countries and has been thought to have a detrimental effect on government service delivery. This paper documents the workings and consequences of corrupt hiring systems with original data from a developing country health bureaucracy. Hiring decisions are shown to be based on a first-price, winner-pay auction, and those hired paid large bribes to get their jobs, averaging 17 months of salary. To establish the consequences of corruption, I collect data on the universe of potential applicants for these jobs and determine the sets of applicants and hires under merit-based hiring procedures, such as standardized testing. Contrary to conventional wisdom, actual hires are of a high quality and are even superior to hires under on a knowledge-based test. This result has a simple economic explanation: the key determinants of bribe offers (i.e. applicant wealth and willingness to pay) are strongly positively correlated with performance in the job. I discuss how the effects of corruption in hiring are heterogeneous and depend on factors such as the extent of rent-seeking opportunities afforded by the job. Misallocation can be minimal in hiring for jobs with limited opportunities for corruption, such as teachers and health workers, but is greater for jobs such as tax collectors or police officers.
Dowry payments are an important part of household finances in India, typically exceeding a year of earnings. This paper uses a large historical data set to document new facts on the emergence of dowry. We show that the proportion of Indian marriages with dowry nearly tripled between 1930 and 1975, with a similar expansion in the size of dowry payments. We test numerous prominent theoretical models of dowry, and find that most cannot explain the observed changes. The rise of dowry in India is best explained by shifts in the earnings distribution of grooms in a search model of marriage markets.
Improving "last mile" public-service delivery is a recurring challenge in developing countries. Could the rapid adoption of mobile phones provide a simple, cost-effective means to do so? We evaluate the impact of a phone-based monitoring system on improving the delivery of a program that transferred nearly a billion dollars to farmers in the Indian state of Telangana, using an at-scale experiment randomized across 5.7 million farmers. A randomly selected sample of officials were told that a representative sample of beneficiaries in their jurisdiction would be called to measure the quality of program implementation. This simple announcement led to a 1.5% increase in the number of farmers receiving their benefits, with a 3.3% increase among farmers in the bottom quartile of landholdings. The program was highly cost-effective, with a cost of 3.6 cents for each additional dollar delivered.